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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the experiences of recent applications of agricultural input 
subsidies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Subsidising agricultural inputs is controversial. On the one hand, 
agricultural input use in SSA is very low by international standards, and the hope is that subsidies may 
induce farmers to adopt the use of inputs and thereby increase agricultural productivity. On the other 
hand, many economists argue that agricultural subsidies of all kinds are expensive, mainly benefit the 
wrong people, and distort agricultural markets by encouraging farmers to overusing whatever is 
subsidised. The recent input subsidy programmes reviewed in this study attempt to meet these 
challenges by introducing so-called “smart” subsidies, which are specifically designed to maximise 
effects at the lowest cost (we will discuss smart subsidies in more detail below). 
The overall objective of the evaluation study is to “...provide an assessment of smart subsidy 
programmes in SSA, focusing on obtained results as well as the way results have (or have not) been 
achieved, hindering and enabling factors, pre-conditions, etc.” (Terms of Reference, included in the 
Appendix). We evaluate the overall performance of selected input subsidy programmes, identify the 
most important factors affecting programme performance, and outline areas where knowledge is scarce 
or non-existent. 
We have selected agricultural input subsidy programmes in four SSA countries, Malawi, Zambia, Ghana 
and Tanzania to form the basis for the evaluation study. The need to assess the subsidy programmes in 
some detail dictates our focus on relatively few cases. The Malawi programme has received a great deal 
of attention as an example of a successful input subsidy programme. It is massive in scale, targeting is 
based on a voucher system, and delivery of inputs to farmers is largely state-managed. It is also 
reasonably well documented in the literature. The large scale programme in Zambia provides an 
example of an alternative non-voucher targeting system and features state-driven delivery. The Ghana 
case demonstrates a relatively small programme with a very market oriented delivery system, and the 
Tanzania case provides insights into the targeting performance of a voucher scheme. Together, the 
selected cases provide considerable breadth in terms of differences in the scope, design, 
implementation and outcome of the programmes, as well as surrounding conditions. 
The evaluation study is organised as follows: In the next section we discuss what is meant by “smart” 
subsidies. The economic philosophy which is the foundation of the concept of smart subsidies also 
forms the basis for our methodology as outlined in section 3. Section 4 evaluates each of the four cases 
and section 5 summarises the lessons learned and section 6 concludes. 
2. Agricultural input subsidies 
2.1. Agricultural inputs 
We use agricultural inputs as a common term for a range of materials, which may be used to enhance 
agricultural productivity. Most important among these are fertilizers and improved seeds. All the 
programmes reviewed subsidise fertilizers, and most of them combine fertilizers with improved seeds 
in small packages.  
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The use of agricultural inputs is fundamental in modern agriculture in developed countries, and they 
were a primary ingredient in the green revolution that swept through Asia and Latin America during the 
‘60s and ‘70s. However, the green revolution largely by-passed SSA, and the use of agricultural inputs 
remains very low. In 2002-2003 Sub-Saharan African farmers used on average 9 kg of fertilizers per ha 
of arable land compared to 100 kg per ha in South Asia, 135 in Southeast Asia and 73 in Latin America 
(Crawford et al, 2006). While agricultural production and productivity soared in Asia and Latin America 
during the last four decades, they have largely stagnated in Africa, resulting in a rising dependency on 
imported grains and an increase in the number of undernourished people (Wiggins and Brooks, 2010; 
Future Agricultures, 2010).  
2.2. “Universal” vs. “smart” input subsidy programmes 
Many African countries, including Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia pursued large 
scale “universal” subsidy programmes from the 1960’s up through the 1980’s (Dorward, 2009). These 
programmes were characterised by a government-controlled input (and output) marketing system, in 
which farmers were supplied with agricultural inputs at controlled and subsidised prices, and often on 
heavily subsidised credit. The experiences under these programmes were mixed. The programmes 
succeeded in raising input use by farmers and increasing agricultural productivity in many cases. 
However, they were extremely expensive, most subsidies tended to benefit relatively well-off and better 
connected farmers, and the advances in agricultural productivity were dependent on continued 
government support. Further, the fertilizer subsidy programmes were prone to inefficiencies arising 
from high administrative costs, government monopolies and political manipulation (Banful, 2010b). As 
the subsidy programmes were dismantled and input markets liberalised as a part of the structural 
adjustment process in the 1980’s and 1990’s, input use and agricultural productivity declined (Crawford 
et al, 2006). 
After a period of liberalised input markets by the end of the last century, new subsidy programmes 
began to emerge in several African countries. The Malawian government pioneered the return to large-
scale subsidies in 1998, when it began distributing free fertilizer to farmers (Banful, 2010b). Other 
countries, such as Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana soon followed Malawi’s example. In 2006, 
Abuja, Nigeria, hosted the Africa Fertilizer Summit under the auspices of the African Union (AU), the 
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the Government of Nigeria (Yawson, 2010). 
An important output of that summit was the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for African Green 
Revolution, in which AU member states set out to increase fertilizer intensity to an average of 50 kg/ha 
by 2015. One of the instruments in a five point action plan was to implement smart subsidy 
programmes to improve access to fertilizers for small-holder farmers. 
Smart subsidy programmes are meant to address the shortcomings of the universal subsidies. To be 
“smart”, subsidy programmes should adhere to a number of design principles, which can be 
summarised under the following headlines (Minde et al, 2008; Tiba, 2009): 
• Targeting specific farmers. Smart subsidies should be targeted specifically at farmers, who do 
not already apply agricultural inputs, as well as the poorest and most vulnerable households. 
This reduces the risks of displacing commercial (non-subsidised) input sales and promotes pro-
poor growth. 
• Market-based solutions. Smart subsidy programmes should utilise and support the further 
development of existing private input supply networks, rather than supplant them with state-
controlled distribution systems. This enhances the efficiency of input delivery as well as 
increases the likelihood that the programme has a sustained impact after its termination. 
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• Exit strategy. Smart subsidy programmes should devise credible exit strategies to put a time 
limit on the support. This is primarily to reduce the risks that the programme becomes 
“hijacked” by political interests (Dorward, 2009) and to facilitate long term sustainability. If 
stakeholders expect the support to continue indefinitely they are less likely to prepare for self-
sustained use of inputs on market terms. Also, a firm exit strategy helps control the costs of the 
programme. 
The three characteristics are largely complementary. If subsidies are well targeted, the greater demand 
for inputs is likely to encourage potential entrepreneurs to establish new businesses, which promotes 
the development of a competitive input market. However, if the subsidised inputs primarily displace 
commercial input sales, private dealers are hurt by the “unfair” state-supported competition and may 
choose to exit the market, thereby reducing competition. Similarly, the more efficient is the targeting 
and input delivery system, the more effective and credible the exit strategy will be. 
As we will see, none of the subsidy programmes considered in this study can be characterised as smart 
subsidies in the pure sense based on these criteria. They are based on the overall idea, and they all 
contain some of the elements mentioned above, but none of them go all the way. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Assessment criteria 
The characterisation of smart subsidies given above suggests that the concept is based on the economic 
principles of efficiency, equity and sustainability. We will therefore apply these principles as our 
assessment criteria. In the following, we briefly discuss each principle in relation to smart input 
subsidies. 
3.1.1. Efficiency 
There is strong evidence to suggest that agricultural inputs raise productivity substantially, and that they 
are essential for sustaining intensive agriculture in the long term without depleting soil fertility 
(Crawford et al, 2006). The obvious question is therefore why so few farmers in SSA have adopted the 
use of agricultural inputs to capture some of these potential benefits. There are two possible answers to 
this question: 1) the economic costs of delivering agricultural inputs to the farmers are too high and the 
benefits in terms higher production too low for adoption of agricultural inputs to be a profitable 
investment; or 2) certain barriers, what economists call market failures, prevent farmers from realising 
the economic potential of agricultural inputs. If the first answer is correct, agricultural input subsidies 
are inefficient. Subsidies merely encourage the adoption of inputs, which are more costly to procure 
than the benefits they provide. If the second answer is correct, subsidies may be efficient as they help 
farmers overcome the market distortions generated by the market failures. The discussion below will 
elaborate on this view. 
The first answer may be correct in some geographical areas and/or some periods of time. Due to 
poorly developed infrastructure, the costs of transporting inputs to remote areas, particularly in land-
locked countries, are very high. Banful (2010b) suggests that around 50% of market fertilizer prices 
across SSA can be attributed to transaction costs compared with e.g. 20% in Thailand. If farmer density 
is also low, the potential demand for expensive agricultural inputs may be so low that agro-dealers will 
find it hard to cover the costs of setting up a shop. Coupled with relatively low agricultural productivity, 
the investment could simply be unprofitable, demand for inputs may not exist, and suppliers will be 
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unwilling to offer access to inputs. In such a case, input subsidies could boost demand and encourage 
input suppliers to expand their presence to remote areas. However, the subsidies would be inefficient. 
Some of the costs of supply would shift from farmers to the state, but the costs would still outweigh 
the economic benefits. Funding for subsidies could be better spent on policies aimed at lowering the 
transaction costs, such as infrastructure investments and market deregulation. 
The profitability of agricultural inputs also varies significantly over time. Figure 1 shows the world 
market fertilizer and maize price indices from 2000-2010. From 2005-2008 the world market price of 
maize, one of the most important staple crops in SSA, almost doubled, which alone would make maize 
production more profitable. However, in the same period fertilizer prices rose much faster than output 
prices and reached record high levels in 2008. So if an investment in fertilizers more or less broke even 
in 2006, it would have become very unprofitable in 2008. Again, in this case an input subsidy would be 
inefficient as it would encourage unprofitable use of inputs. 
Figure 1: Fertilizer and Maize prices 2000 - 2010 
 
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities database. 
Notes: Prices are real USD indices of world market prices. 
The second possible answer to why agricultural input adoption in SSA is so low suggests that market 
failures exist to distort input markets and discourage farmers from using agricultural inputs. Examples 
of market failures most frequently cited in the literature are credit constraints, imperfect competition 
and risk of crop failure (Dorward, 2009): 
• Credit constraints: If farmers are unable to obtain the necessary funding (or if credit costs are 
too high), they may not be able to make an otherwise profitable investment in agricultural 
inputs. This is what Dorward (2009) refers to as the affordability problem. A subsidy reduces 
the funding needs, but may not necessarily resolve the distortion completely, as farmers still 
have to cover the subsidised prices. 
• Imperfect competition: If agricultural input markets are imperfectly competitive, input 
suppliers tend to charge higher prices in order to capture greater profits or to cover more 
inefficient business practices. This may result in farmers not being able to afford investments, 
which would be profitable with a more competitive market. In this case, an input subsidy can 
have both positive and negative consequences. It may increase aggregate demand, attract new 
entrants to the market and increase competition. However, if this does not happen, for instance 
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if the demand impact is too weak or if the subsidies are implemented in a way that favours 
incumbents, the subsidy may largely benefit the imperfectly competitive firms. 
• Risk of crop failure: Investing in agricultural inputs is a risky business, particularly since many 
hybrid seeds and fertilizers require a reasonably well timed application and stable water supply. 
A season of prolonged drought can largely wipe out the entire investment and generate 
significant losses. Particularly the poorest smallholders are very vulnerable to poor harvests and 
may not be able to absorb the costs of a failed investment. Rather than risk losing everything, 
they may choose not to apply agricultural inputs, settling for a smaller but more stable surplus. 
Agricultural input subsidies increase the expected benefits of the investment and reduce the 
costs of a failed investment. 
It follows from this discussion that input subsidies may be efficient if they counteract distortions 
generated by market failures and inefficient if they do not. However, market failures are hard to 
measure, and estimates of how subsidies affect their distortions are usually not available. In practise, it 
will be difficult to clearly distinguish between unprofitable input use and market failures. For instance, 
the time dimension complicates matters greatly. Looking only at 2008 when fertilizer prices were very 
high, we may come to the conclusion that fertilizer use was inefficient for many farmers and should be 
discontinued. However, a sudden drop in fertilizer demand could have detrimental effects on the input 
market by driving vulnerable suppliers out of business, which could over time exacerbate problems of 
imperfectly competitive markets and limited access to inputs in some areas. Would it in such cases be 
better to intensify subsidisation of inputs to prop up demand, thereby sacrificing short term efficiency 
for long term gains? 
Another dilemma relates to the poor state of development of the private input markets in many SSA 
countries. Proponents of smart input subsidies (e.g. Minde et al 2008; Tiba, 2009) emphasise taking a 
market-oriented approach to ensure efficient delivery of the subsidised inputs to farmers. However, 
particularly in remote rural areas, private input suppliers may not exist because marketing costs are too 
high and the customer base is too small. Programme designers therefore face the dilemma of whether 
to pursue a market oriented approach or to establish a state-managed supply system. The former option 
would be more efficient and sustainable, but might not have the capacity to reach the remote areas. The 
latter option could more effectively ensure a broader geographical coverage, but could also risk 
undermining the development of a more competitive private input supply sector.  
The choice is essentially one between greater efficiency and sustainability on the one hand and 
(geographical) equity on the other. However, the distinction between high transaction costs and market 
failures as causes of missing private markets influences the balance between efficiency/sustainability 
and equity. If the farmers’ lack of access to privately supplied inputs is mainly due to high transaction 
costs, private input suppliers may be less willing to establish local outlets as they may expect demand to 
disappear again after the subsidies are phased out. On the other hand, if the missing markets are mainly 
due to market failures, a market oriented approach may help alleviate these market failures, for instance 
by enhancing competition in input supply. As mentioned above, the distinction is hard to make in 
practise, and the situation is likely to vary greatly between countries, or even regionally within countries. 
Bearing these challenges in mind, we will make an assessment of the likely effect of subsidies on market 
distortions and the profitability of inputs, outline possible trade-offs, and identify areas where more 
knowledge is needed for a clearer assessment. 
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3.1.2. Equity 
Agricultural input subsidies can be a useful instrument for promoting greater equality by targeting 
subsidies specifically at the poorest smallholders. However, it is not entirely clear whether such 
redistributive objectives are compatible with the efficiency criteria. On the one hand, the poorest 
smallholders are most likely the ones that are most constrained by market failures, such as credit 
constraints and vulnerability to the risks of crop failures. On the other hand, poor subsistence farmers 
may lack complementary resources, such as skills, scale of operation, productive assets, or the financial 
resources to pay even the subsidised prices, to make effective use of the subsidised inputs. In other 
words, use of agricultural inputs by poor smallholders may simply be unprofitable even if 
unconstrained by market failures. 
Thus, there may be a trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives. If the primary aim of a subsidy 
programme is to achieve pro-poor growth, targeting the most vulnerable households may increase 
equality at the expense of efficiency. Similarly, an objective of increasing national self-sufficiency in 
grain production will require the programme to target the most productive households, who may be 
somewhat less-poor. Most of the programmes reviewed in this study have both objectives in some 
form. We provide an assessment of the programmes’ intended targets, how well these targets are hit, 
and how well the programmes perform in terms of a general equity criterion. 
3.1.3. Sustainability 
Subsidy programmes are sustainable if they can be maintained over the long term without draining the 
public resources, or if the outcomes in terms of wider adoption of agricultural inputs and improved 
agricultural productivity persist after their termination. The universal input subsidy programmes 
pursued by many SSA countries during the 70’s and 80’s largely failed on both accounts.  
Long term subsidy programmes may be economically justified as long as they meet efficiency and 
equity objectives. There are, however, political economy reasons to be sceptical about long term 
programmes. Subsidies represent a significant value, which is transferred from the state to farmers, 
suppliers and other stakeholders. As such, stakeholders have a great and obvious interest in the 
continuation and expansion of subsidies. In particular, when subsidies are rationed and targeted at 
specific groups, the people controlling how subsidies are targeted may exploit their power for personal 
gain. Policy makers may also be inclined to expand the government support irrespective of its 
performance, as it signals leadership and willingness to act. The politics of input subsidisation therefore 
carry a risk that the programme gains a life of its own, grows more inefficient and less equitable, and 
eventually becomes unsustainable. 
To counter these effects, smart subsidies are meant to be a temporary measure designed with a clear 
exit strategy detailing the termination of the programme. A sustainable smart subsidy programme seeks 
to affect a permanent impact by a short term boost, or in other words to “kick-start” the market for 
agricultural subsidies. The permanent impacts can be achieved by alleviating the market failures 
plaguing the input markets directly or by raising the productive capacity of poor smallholders to a 
sufficiently high level that the market failures are no longer constraining. For instance, if the subsidy 
programme succeeds at permanently developing a more competitive private input supply, the lower 
prices will make inputs more widely accessible to smallholders. Similarly, if the programme helps 
smallholders accumulate productive and financial assets from a few years of surplus harvests, the 
farmers may be able to finance full-priced inputs from their own savings after programme termination. 
On the other hand, if market failures simply manifests again, once the programme ends the effects are 
likely to prove short-lived. The evaluation study will assess whether and how the subsidy programmes 
considered here are likely to have a lasting effect on potential market failures or households’ assets. 
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3.2. The political economy of input subsidies 
While the evaluation study will primarily focus on the economics of input subsidy programmes, the 
political economy of input subsidies cannot be completely ignored. Ideally, policies would be 
implemented to maximise national welfare, but it is naive to believe that personal political motivations 
do not play a role. In fact, Dorward (2009) argues that political economy difficulties are particularly 
problematic in poor rural societies, as 1) the potential personal and political gains from subsidy rents 
are very large relative to other income opportunities, so incentives for political manipulation are strong; 
and 2) fiscal resources are very scarce and costly to collect, so the adverse consequences of wasteful 
policies are great. 
Irrespective of the economic justifications for large scale input subsidy programmes, their political 
benefits may be substantial Input subsidies are effectively transfers of value from the government 
directly to recipients, so benefits are immediate and easily recognised. They may generate relatively fast 
and easily observable results in terms of greater food production, which allows policy makers to signal 
strong leadership and decisiveness. Subsidies can be narrowly targeted at specifically favoured 
constituents, while excluding others, and they may just as easily be taken away again if political 
objectives are not met. Thus, it is possible that the popularity of large scale input subsidy programmes 
in SSA is mainly due to their political attractiveness rather than economic superiority. Banful (2010b) 
suggests that historical anecdotal evidence supports this view. The universal subsidy programmes were 
maintained for many years in spite of strong indications of their inefficiencies and unsustainable drain 
on fiscal resources. It took heavy pressure from outside donors and the threat of imminent fiscal 
collapse to push through liberalising reforms. 
3.3. Structure of the study 
We structure the study of the input subsidy programmes into the following headlines, which consider 
the most important elements of smart subsidy programmes: 
• Background: What were the motivations for the subsidy programmes? 
• Outcome: What are the overall outcomes of the subsidy programmes in terms of increases in 
input use, agricultural productivity and output, changes in market prices, etc. and how do the 
benefits compare to the costs of the programme? 
• Scope: What is the size of the programme, how wide does it cover and what is the extent of 
subsidisation?  
• Targeting: What type of targeting and rationing mechanism (e.g. voucher) is used? Who 
controls beneficiary selection and which criteria serve as guidelines? How well were the 
intended targets reached? 
• Delivery: How are the inputs delivered to the end users? Who supplies and who distributes the 
inputs. To what extent is the private sector involved? What is the risk of displacing commercial 
input supplies? Are inputs delivered in a timely and effective fashion? 
• Exit strategy: Do the programmes exhibit a clear exit strategy, is it credible and has it actually 
worked as planned? 
• Assessment: Based on the available information presented above, how will we assess the 
performance of the programme in terms of efficiency, equity and sustainability? 
In section 4 we consider each of the four cases in turn, and in section 5 we summarise the lessons 
learned using the same headlines. 
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3.4. Selection of cases and literature 
We have selected relatively few cases to form the basis of the evaluation study to allow a certain depth 
and detail in our scrutiny. The four cases are 
• Malawi: Agricultural Input Support Programme 2005/6 –  ongoing (AISP) 
• Zambia: Fertilizer Support Programme 2002/3 – ongoing (ZFSP) 
• Ghana: Fertilizer Subsidy Programme 2008 – 2009 (GFSP) 
• Tanzania: National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme 2008 – ongoing (NAIVS) 
These four cases are the ones that show up most frequently in our literature searches. They provide a 
fairly wide variation in terms of programme size, objectives, targeting and delivery mechanisms, degree 
of success and empirical evidence. By choosing these cases, we aim at forming a reasonably clear 
picture of recent experiences with input subsidies. 
The evaluation study is based on two types of literature, i) official programme documents, reviews and 
evaluations; and ii) empirical research papers. The first set of literature typically covers a broad range of 
issues, though not always in great depth. The second group investigates selected features (such as 
targeting, outcome, etc.) in more detail, usually based on relatively narrow samples. We focus on the 
most recent literature, partly to cover the latest evidence and partly because some of the programmes 
(particularly the ones in Tanzania and Ghana) are relatively new.  
4. Selected input subsidy programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
This section reviews and evaluates the four selected input subsidy programmes. Table 1 summarises the 
main features of the four programmes. 
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4.1. Malawi, Agricultural Input Support Programme/Farm Input Support 
Programme (AISP)1 
4.1.1. Background 
In Malawi 88% of the population lives in rural areas and slightly more than half of these are poor. The 
rural households are almost exclusively maize producers, but only 10% of them are net sellers, whereas 
around 60% of smallholders are net buyers of maize. This dependency on market purchases of maize 
leaves poor households vulnerable to the high and volatile maize prices usually observed in Malawi. 
Thus, the political motives for supporting improvements in agricultural productivity are largely driven 
by a desire to increase smallholder self-sufficiency in maize production and reduce their exposure to 
maize market risks. As formulated by Chinsinga (2011), “In Malawi, maize is politics, and input 
subsidies are central to this”. 
The Agricultural Input Support Programme (AISP) in Malawi, initiated in the 2005/6 season, builds 
upon a long tradition of subsidising agricultural inputs.2 The recent wave of “smart” subsidies started 
with the establishment of a programme to distribute free “starter packs” in 1998/99, initially to all 
households, but by 2001/2 to a more limited number of targeted households (Targeted Input Program, 
TIP). This starter pack programme provided valuable experience in beneficiary targeting and 
establishment of logistics systems to distribute the inputs to rural households. Partly as a result of these 
early attempts, Malawian farmers were even prior to the AISP some of the most intensive fertilizer 
users in Sub-Saharan Africa, using around 30 kg/ha compared with a SSA average of 9 kg/ha. As the 
TIP was scaled down in the 2004/5 season, Malawi was hit by bad weather resulting in a very poor 
maize harvest, which translated into high prices and acute food shortages (Chibwana et al, 2010). In 
response, the Malawi government reintroduced large scale input subsidies in the form of the AISP in 
2005/6. The overall objective of this programme is to “...increase resource poor smallholder farmers’ 
access to improved agricultural inputs in order to achieve food self-sufficiency and to increase resource 
poor smallholder farmers’ income through increased food and cash crop production” (Dorward et al, 
2010, p. 12). 
4.1.2. Outcome 
The AISP appears to have had a substantial effect on maize output, but some uncertainty surrounds the 
estimates due to other factors (e.g. the weather) influencing the data. Official estimates suggest that 
national maize harvests increased by around 1 million tonnes in 2005/6 rising to more than 2 million 
tonnes in the 2008/9 season (around 54% and 114%) compared to the 2002/3 and 2003/4 seasons. 
These estimates are, however, highly contentious. More conservative estimates by Dorward et al (2010) 
based on assumptions about average maize responses to fertilizer, put the increase in maize output at 
around 400,000 tonnes in 2005/6 to 1,000,000 tonnes in 2008/9 (corresponding to an increase of 23% 
and 54%) compared to pre-AISP harvests. These estimates by Dorward et al (2010) are derived by 
multiplying the estimated increase in fertilizer use with an estimated average fertilizer response rate, 
adjusting for weather, use of improved seeds and delivery delays. For the lack of better statistics, this 
approach seems reasonable, but the estimates must be viewed as highly uncertain. 
A few studies have tried to quantify the impact of the input subsidy based on a more stringent scientific 
(econometric) methodology. Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2010) try to estimate the dynamic effects of the 
                                                 
1 This section is based on Dorward et al (2010) and Dorward and Chirwa (2011) unless otherwise specified. 
2 The programme changed its name to Farm Input Support Programme (FISP) in 2008/9. As the new programme is 
essentially a continuation of the old AISP, we refer to the whole programme by AISP. 
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AISP. They find that a fertilizer subsidy significantly increases maize production within the same year, 
and there are some indications of positive effects on maize production in subsequent seasons but these 
are surrounded by greater uncertainty. On the other hand, they find little evidence of a long-term effect 
on household assets or general wellbeing.  
An impact assessment based on household surveys by Chibwana et al (2010) suggests that the 
programme increased maize yields of recipient farmers by 447 kg/ha (around 42%), of which just over 
half (249 kg/ha) can be attributed to fertilizers and the rest to improved seed. Such production 
increases are within the range estimated by Dorward et al (2010) mentioned above. Chibwana et al 
(2010) also report that the AISP caused some change in cropping patterns, as farmers reallocated land 
from alternative food crops such as cassava or sweet potato towards maize. To the extent that fertilized 
maize is more productive, this shift represents a further expansion in food production, but it may also 
increase risks of crop failures as cassava is more resistant to droughts than maize (Barratt et al, 2006). It 
is not possible to assess the severity and implications of these effects based on the available material.  
The evidence reviewed above indicates that the expansion in maize output is sizeable, and it is therefore 
all the more puzzling that the effect did not translate into an observable decline in maize prices. During 
the decade preceding the start of the AISP, average local maize prices oscillated around a price of USD 
0.2/kg (1990 prices), perhaps with a slightly declining trend. The larger harvests obtained from 2005/6 
onwards did not result in the anticipated drop in maize prices, and prices following the 2008/9 record 
harvest actually rose by almost 100% over the previous season. A number of possible explanations are 
offered, among which the most important is that demand seems to have increased at least as fast as 
supply. For instance, partly due to official overestimation of maize harvests in 2007, the government 
contracted with the government of Zimbabwe to export 400,000 tonnes of maize to Zimbabwe. The 
government managed to export only around 283,000 tonnes before suspending the contract due to 
rapidly increasing domestic prices (Minde et al 2008). Similarly, in 2009/10 the government added 
130,000 tonnes of maize to the strategic grain reserve and private traders accumulated a further 100,000 
tonnes (Dorward et al 2010). A second reason for the exceptionally high maize prices following the 
2008/9 season could be the extremely high fertilizer prices during this season, which are partly passed 
through to output prices. Although beneficiaries of the AISP were shielded from the fertilizer price 
increase, it is likely that more commercially oriented farmers supplying the maize market as well as 
maize importers were more exposed.  
Evidence on the effects on poverty is harder to obtain. Dorward et al (2010) reports on findings from 
focus group discussions, which suggest that rural real wages increased continuously over the AISP 
lifetime even for poor non-beneficiaries. As maize production by AISP beneficiaries increases, the 
households’ dependence on off-farm work is reduced and more jobs are available for non-beneficiaries 
and land-less poor. It is not possible to judge how strong or widespread such effects were, or to which 
extent the reported reductions in poverty rates can be attributed to the AISP. 
Dorward et al (2010) calculates the economic returns of the AISP based on their estimates of the effect 
on production. The economic returns, defined as the net benefits relative to total costs, vary 
considerable depending on the weather, maize and fertilizer prices, assumptions about yield responses, 
etc. Assuming a moderate yield response, the estimates suggest that the very good conditions prevailing 
in the 2006/7 season produced decent economic returns of around 54%, implying that a USD 100 
investment in programme activities generated a USD 154 worth of output. More modest returns were 
achieved in the 2005/6 (despite plentiful rains) and 2007/8 seasons (12% and 6% respectively). 
However, the 2008/9 season generated negative returns despite good weather and high maize prices 
due to extremely high fertilizer prices. In conclusion, these estimates suggest that economic returns are 
likely to be modestly positive on average but with a high degree of volatility. 
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4.1.3. Scope 
The AISP is a massive programme, and the scope of the programme has expanded continuously over 
its lifetime, as illustrated in table 2 below. By the 2007/8 season, the programme provided what 
amounted to an average 79% subsidy to 59% of all farming households. Total costs were around USD 
117 million, corresponding to 3.4% of GDP (9% of the total government budget). The following 
season 2008/9 was exceptional due to extremely high fertilizer prices. The government decided to keep 
the prices paid by farmers constant and absorb the input price increase. As a result, the subsidy ratio 
averaged 91%, and the total costs of the programme jumped to almost USD 285 million (6.6% of GDP 
and 16% of the public budget). Fertilizer prices have come down again somewhat since 2009, but we 
do not have any later figures on programme expenditure. Initially, the programme subsidised mainly 
maize fertilizers and to a lesser extent tobacco fertilizers, but it has since then branched out to include 
maize seeds (of which 84% were hybrid), as well as a bit of cotton seed, legume seed and cotton 
pesticides.  
Table 2: Scope of the AISP in Malawi 
 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 
Programme budget 
(USD million) 
36 54 82 139 
Programme costs 
(USD million) 
51 91 117 285 
% of GDP 2.1 3.1 3.4 6.6 
% budget overrun 42 69 43 105 
% household 
coverage 
N/A 54 59 65 
% subsidy 64 72 79 91 
Source: Dorward et al (2010) 
4.1.4. Targeting 
The AISP is based on a voucher system. Selected recipient households receive two coupons, each of 
which can be redeemed for a bag of maize or tobacco fertilizer or a bag of maize seed (hybrid or Open 
Pollinated Variety, OPV).3 The fertilizer bags carry an additional fixed price (MK 950), but the seed 
bags require no extra expenditure. Thus, in effect AISP offers an input subsidy as well as an input price 
control mechanism, under which the programme absorbs all input price variations. This is both a 
strength and a weakness of the programme. One the one hand, the stability of input prices ensures that 
smallholders can gradually build capacity for applying inputs, maintain soil fertility, and procure 
improved seeds season after season. Small input suppliers may develop and solidify their businesses 
without sudden demand disruptions. On the other hand, when the government carries all the risk, 
programme costs are difficult to control and the intervention risks becoming unsustainable. In all years, 
the realised programme costs were over budget, in 2008/9 by more than 100% (see table 2 above). 
Coupons are printed centrally and distributed to the district level. Initially, the distribution of vouchers 
to districts was based on historical cropping patterns, but from the 2007/8 season greater emphasis was 
                                                 
3 Maize fertilizer consists of a 50kg bag of 23:21:0 +4s or Urea, tobacco fertilizer covers a 50 kg bag of Compound D or 
Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN), and maize seeds come in 2kg bags of hybrid seeds or 3-4kg bags of OPV seeds. 
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placed on the number of farming households. At the district level, Traditional Authorities allocated the 
vouchers among villages and the local Village Development Committees were responsible for 
identifying recipients. The official criteria for determining beneficiaries are not very precise. They 
mainly stipulate that recipients should own land being cultivated in the relevant season and that priority 
should be given vulnerable groups, particularly female-headed households. As a result, much discretion 
was left to village chiefs and there appears to be considerable variation between regions. Household 
surveys suggest that coupons were disproportionately allocated to households with relatively more land 
more assets and to male-headed households. Such evidence is supported by Chibwana et al (2010) who 
found that the most vulnerable and female-headed households were less likely to receive vouchers, 
whereas long term residents of villages were more likely to be selected. 
Inappropriate targeting of programme benefits risks displacing commercial input sales, if recipients 
would have bought agricultural inputs anyway in the absence of subsidies. Commercial sales 
displacement represents a shift in input sales from non-subsidised to subsidised sales and does not 
increase the total use of agricultural inputs. A high degree of displacement is therefore detrimental to 
programme effectiveness. No firm data exists on the extent of displacement, but Dorward et al (2010) 
suggest that around 30% of subsidised maize fertilizer sales would have taken place on commercial 
terms if there had been no support. These estimates are based on examinations of changes in aggregate 
sales in 2005/6 and 2006/7, and the authors refer to supporting evidence from a panel data analysis of 
farmer purchases. If such estimates are correct, displacement represents a substantial reduction in the 
effectiveness of the programme. Even worse it undermines the efforts to develop a competitive private 
input supply sector, as private suppliers that are not part of the programme face strong state-subsidised 
competition. 
4.1.5. Delivery 
Farmers can redeem vouchers at retail outlets of firms, which are selected each season through tender. 
Wholesale supply (imports) of fertilizers is mainly undertaken by large private firms, but two large 
parastatals, ADMARC and SFFRFM, dominate the distribution and retailing of fertilizers to the 
households. In the 2006/7 and 2007/8 seasons, a few large private companies (also involved in 
importation and wholesaling) with developed retail networks were authorised to market some of the 
inputs and were responsible for 24-28% of subsidised fertilizer sales, but in the 2008/9 season no retail 
contracts were awarded to private distributors. The very limited involvement of the private sector in 
input distribution may in part have been due to distrust between the government and the private sector 
(Dorward et al, 2008). 
The market for improved maize seeds is largely private, with both large retail chains and smaller 
independent agro-dealers distributing subsidised seed. Supply of improved seeds is, however, 
dominated by multinational corporations, including Monsanto, which alone controls 50% of the market 
(Chinsinga, 2011). This concentration of market power is exacerbated by the AISP, partly due to 
political priorities. The subsidy programme offers both subsidised hybrids, which are exclusively 
imported by multinationals, and OPV maize seeds, which are supplied by local seed companies. 
Chinsinga (2011) argues that over the life time of the programme attention has shifted more and more 
towards hybrid seeds. Hybrid maize seeds generate higher yields than OPVs and are therefore more 
attractive for policy makers, who want to show fast results. However, NGOs argue that OPVs are 
more suitable for smallholders, as they are more resistant to pests and diseases, more drought resistant 
and more familiar to farmers. Crucially, harvested OPV maize may be retained as seeds for the next 
season, unlike hybrid seeds, which must be bought from the market each season. Thus, adopting 
subsidised hybrid seeds may generate a dependency on the multinational producers, which may prove 
devastating for smallholders once subsidies are phased out. 
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The efficiency of the programme is also affected by the timing of deliveries and the extent of fraud and 
corruption by programme stakeholders. In Malawi, agricultural inputs should be available to farmers by 
end of November to ensure their effective use. Although the timing of input deliveries has improved 
over the lifetime of the programme, only 30% of all sales had arrived by end November in 2008/9 
season, most of the rest was delivered during the following month. Taken together with relatively high 
displacement rates, late delivery is detrimental for the objective of increasing fertilizer use. Recipients of 
input vouchers may hold off purchases of inputs on commercial terms in the expectation of receiving 
subsidised inputs shortly. If these inputs are delivered too late, farmers may actually end up reducing 
input use rather than merely displacing commercial inputs. 
The extent of fraud and corruption is difficult to determine, but fragmental information based on focus 
group discussions and household surveys suggests that some problems do exist (Dorward et al, 2010). 
A small number of households (5%) report having to pay a fee for gaining access to vouchers and an 
estimated 14-20% of vouchers were redeemed together with a small ‘tip’ on top of the regular 
beneficiary co-financing. There were also reports of voucher counterfeiting, which in 2008/9 accounted 
for 27% of sales by parastatals and 3% of private retail sales. Dorward et al (2010) suggests that the 
better performance of private retailers could be attributed to the fact that they were much faster at 
returning vouchers to the programme for final settlement, which allowed rapid identification and 
termination of counterfeiting schemes. 
4.1.6. Exit strategy 
The programme does not appear to have any exit strategy. It has been in effect for 6 years, and its 
budget has expanded continuously throughout its lifetime, from MK 5.1 billion in 2005/6 to MK 21 
billion in the 2011/12 budget (Government of Malawi, 2011). There are no indications that a phase out 
of the programme is planned in the future. 
4.1.7. Assessment 
All evidence indicates that the Malawi AISP has a substantial positive effect on the use of agricultural 
inputs, agricultural productivity and food production. However, the gains come at a massive cost to the 
Malawi government budget (direct donor support only covered 5% of total programme costs in 
2008/9), which could alternatively be used for investing in infrastructure, education, health, etc. The 
best estimates available on the economic returns of the programme appear to be positive but also 
relatively modest and highly volatile depending on input and output prices, weather conditions, 
displacement rates and efficiency of programme administration.  
One of the most important sources of uncertainty is the design of the instrument as a variable subsidy 
with a fixed farmer payment. This provides the greatest degree of security to farmers, as they are 
shielded from input price volatility. However, it also reduces the overall efficiency of the programme. 
The high fertilizer prices in 2008/9 were a signal from the market that fertilizers were in short supply. 
From an efficiency point of view it is better in such a situation to economise of the use of fertilizers, 
which would most likely have taken place if farmers faced at least a part of the price rises. In the event, 
total subsidised fertilizer sales declined only slightly resulting in massive budget overruns.  
Usually, some efficiency must be sacrificed in favour of a more equal distribution of resources. 
However, the review of the AISP suggests that the objective of targeting the most poor and vulnerable 
households is very difficult to achieve for two reasons. Firstly, there must be some mechanism for 
identifying worthy beneficiaries, in this case Village Development Committees (VDCs). Although there 
seems to be scope for fine-tuning targeting criteria, VDCs will still have considerable discretion in 
allocating vouchers, leaving room for abuse of powers, rent seeking and influence by local politics. The 
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most vulnerable are unlikely to rank highly with such priorities. Secondly, households need to have a 
certain minimum productive capacity to be able to use the subsidised inputs effectively, such as skills, 
land, financial resources, complementary assets and labour. On the other hand, although the poorest 
households are not targeted directly, they may still gain indirectly by lower food prices and greater job 
opportunities provided by the general improvements in agricultural productivity. Lower food prices did 
not materialise in Malawi following the implementation of the AISP, but Dorward et al (2010) suggest 
that rural real wages may have increased anyway by a tightening of the rural labour markets. 
There is considerable risk related to the long-term sustainability of the programme in its present form. 
Total costs are extremely high relative to the government budget and the total economy. What is worse, 
the budget has been increasing steadily throughout its lifetime and it has proved difficult to control as 
evidenced by high and increasing budget overruns. These trends are exacerbated by the lack of credible 
exit strategy. It is questionable whether the Malawi government is able to bear the burden in the long 
run.  
A second aspect of sustainability is the extent to which the higher adoption of agricultural inputs is 
likely to persist after a possible future programme termination. This is doubtful. There is little to 
suggest that programme activities have addressed the underlying barriers to a well-functioning 
agricultural input market, such as a thin private input supply network, lack of access to credit and high 
costs of input delivery. Distribution and retailing of fertilizers is still dominated by parastatals, and there 
seems to be little scope for new suppliers to capture a share of the market, though the market for 
improved seeds appears to be more competitive. The high financing and transaction costs are not 
reduced but merely shifted from farmers to government. A sustainable outcome could be achieved if 
beneficiaries were able to accumulate sufficient financial and productive assets to overcome the market 
barriers on their own after programme termination. However, the little evidence that exists (Ricker-
Gilbert and Jayne, 2010) suggests that such capital accumulation is not happening. Should the AISP be 
dismantled in the future, there is a substantial risk that much of the gains in terms of more widespread 
agricultural input adoption will be reversed. 
In conclusion, the Malawi AISP has a large effect on productivity and output, but the programme is 
very costly, it largely fails to target the most vulnerable households and its long term sustainability is 
questionable. 
4.2. Zambia, Fertilizer Support Programme (ZFSP)4 
4.2.1. Background 
The Fertilizer Support Programme (ZFSP) in Zambia follows earlier attempts at stimulating the 
adoption of agricultural inputs, mainly fertilizers and hybrid seeds, in the production of maize. Earlier 
programmes focused less on direct subsidies and more on controlling input prices and making sure that 
inputs were available to smallholders through state-managed production and distribution. Indirect and 
unintentional subsidisation was provided in the form of state-provided credit, of which only 5%-10% 
was recovered. 
In 2001 the government estimated that only 30% of smallholders had access to improved seeds and just 
20% had access to fertilizers. Small-scale farmers had too few financial resources to generate sufficient 
demand to support a competitive private input supply sector. In this context, the ZFSP was launched at 
                                                 
4 This section is based on World Bank (2010) unless stated otherwise. 
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the start of the 2002/3 agricultural season. It sought to break from earlier programmes by subsidising 
inputs directly rather than providing credit and by focusing on the development of a competitive 
private input supply sector rather than relying on state-managed distribution. Specific objectives of the 
programme can be summarised as  
1. To ensure timely, effective and adequate access of smallholder farmers to agricultural inputs in 
the form of fertilizer and hybrid maize seeds 
2. To facilitate the development of a competitive private sector in the supply of agricultural inputs 
3. To facilitate the process of farmer organisation, dissemination of knowledge and creation of 
other rural institutions that will contribute to the development of the agricultural sector. 
4.2.2. Outcome 
Although evidence suggests that the ZFSP was less effective than anticipated by the government, it 
does appear to have a substantial effect on maize yields and production of participants. In designing the 
programme, the government expected that farmers were able to achieve a maize yield of 3 tonnes per 
hectare, almost a trebling of average yields among smallholders in Zambia. Instead, a survey conducted 
by the end of the 2007/8 season showed that participants achieved an average yield of around 2 tonnes 
per hectare, albeit with large regional variations.  
In aggregate, World Bank (2010) estimates that total production in Zambia increased by 146,000 tonnes 
of maize 2007/8, corresponding to 89% growth in output as a result of the ZFSP. This increase covers 
output due to higher yields (estimated as 82,000 tonnes or 50% yield increase) as well as expansion in 
the area cultivated by maize (around 64,000 tonnes). These estimates are characterised by considerable 
uncertainty. They are based on a household survey of ZFSP beneficiaries, the results of which are 
extrapolated to the national level. In the survey, farmers are asked how much they produced in the 
current season compared with seasons prior to support from the ZFSP. So the estimates are derived 
from farmers responses (partly based on their recollection of past production), and there are apparently 
no attempts at controlling for factors unrelated to the programme. They are, however, the best 
estimates available. 
The World Bank (2010) study also estimates the total costs of the programme, amounting to ZMK 183 
billion, or USD 47 million, including direct costs of the inputs, administration and logistics, as well as 
the indirect costs of salaries paid to government staff in proportion to the resources spent on the 
programme and farmer contributions. These cost estimates imply that the increase in maize supply was 
made possible at a cost of around USD 325 per tonnes at the farm gate. In comparison import prices 
fluctuated between USD 295 and USD 406 per tonnes during the period under investigation (2007-
2009).  
On the face of it, this suggests that the programme has been reasonably profitable from a national 
perspective. There are, however, costs that are not sufficiently accounted for in the estimate. Applying 
agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizers, is more labour intensive and the opportunity costs of labour 
are not included. Also, farm gate prices do not include the often considerable transport costs to urban 
centres. Finally, a substantial part of the incremental production is attributable to an increase in the area 
cultivated by maize. To the extent that the increase in maize plantings is brought about by displacing 
alternative crops, the value of the displaced crops should be added as a further opportunity costs. Even 
where land is “free”, continued land expansion may not be sustainable in the long run. If the effect on 
land expansion is factored out, the resource costs of the ZFSP amount to USD 579 per tonnes, 
substantially higher than the import prices. As a means of increasing food security in outlying areas, the 
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ZFSP may provide reasonable value for money, but as a source of increased national food supply the 
programme appears to be largely uncompetitive. 
4.2.3. Scope 
The ZFSP is designed to reach around 125,000 farming households, although in 2006/7 and 2008/9 
the government budgeted for some 200,000 households. It is not entirely clear why the planned 
number of beneficiaries changed so much over time, but it may have something to do with the 
government budgeting process. According to government funding rules, the total budget for the 
programme must be negotiated each fiscal year and substantial variation in the budget from year to year 
is possible. This is also a source of serious administrative difficulties as discussed in more detail below. 
The ZFSP subsidised inputs by around 60%, but the government contribution increased to as much as 
80% following the extremely high fertilizer prices during the 2008/9 season. In total, the USD 47 
million estimated cost of the programme in 2007/8 corresponds to around 0.4% of GDP and 1.6% of 
the public budget (the budgeted costs for 2008/9 season amounted to around 0.9% of GDP. Although 
not as massive as the Malawi AISP reviewed above, the programme is still considered large scale. 
4.2.4. Targeting 
Farmer cooperatives, specifically approved by the government, play a central role in identifying 
beneficiaries and collecting the farmers’ payments, which are deposited before the inputs are handed 
out. According to the targeting criteria, recipient households should 
• be an active small-scale farmer 
• have the capacity to cultivate between one and five hectares of land,  
• be able to cover 40% of commercial input prices,  
• should have no prior history as a defaulter in earlier government subsidised credit programmes.  
In addition, farmers need to be a member of the cooperative to benefit from the ZFSP. Each 
beneficiary household is entitled to pick up a package of agricultural inputs, consisting of sufficient 
amounts of fertilizers and hybrid seeds to cultivate one ha. of land using the dosage recommended by 
the government.5 Compared to the value of the vouchers distributed by AISP in Malawi, the ZFSP 
packages are considerably larger, by a factor of around 8-10.  
The selection criteria as well as the size of the input packages reflect a focus on relatively less-poor 
farming households. The stipulation that beneficiaries should be able to cultivate at least one hectare of 
land effectively excludes the 40% poorest smallholders, who own less land (Minde et al 2008). Also, the 
large input packages and the requirement that beneficiaries are members of an approved cooperative, 
which demands a membership fee, also serves to discriminate against the poorest. The bias against the 
poorest smallholders is reflected in the evidence characterising the recipients. Surveys of recipients 
reveal that more than 85% of farmers receiving support in 2007/8 cultivated one hectare or more of 
land (Minde et al 2008), and 35% of beneficiaries owned draft animals compared to a national average 
of around 11% (World Bank 2010). This suggests that the ZFSP largely hit their intended targets, but 
these targets were not the poorest smallholders. 
                                                 
5 Specifically, one package consists of four 50kg bags of compound D basal fertilizer, four 50kg bags of urea top dressing, as 
well as one 20kg bag of hybrid seeds (in short 20 kg seed + 4x4 fertilizer). 
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Targeting the less-poor households risks undermining the effectiveness of the programme through 
displacement of commercial input sales, as these households are more likely to be able to finance input 
purchases on market terms. Evidence to this effect is mixed. A survey of ZFSP beneficiaries suggests 
that 50% of recipients of subsidised inputs bought inputs from private shops before receiving ZFSP 
support generating a strong potential for displacement. However, the same survey revealed that 43% 
continued to complement their subsidised package with inputs purchased on commercial terms from 
private suppliers. It is not clear whether these households reduced their purchases of private inputs, or 
to which extent the subsidised packages inspired farmers to adopt agricultural inputs more widely. The 
World Bank (2010) study concludes that displacement constituted at least 7% of subsidised sales, 
generated by the recipients who stopped purchasing commercial inputs. However, this number could 
be significantly higher if the remaining 43% commercial customers also purchased less than before. 
4.2.5. Delivery 
The supply and distribution of the subsidised inputs are relatively centralised. Private sector 
involvement is sought through a tendering procedure, but in practise private sector involvement is 
limited. Compound D, one type of fertilizer, is usually supplied by a state-owned company (Nitrogen 
Chemicals of Zambia). Contracts for urea, another type of fertilizer, are typically awarded the same two 
large private firms (Omnia Small Scale Limited and Nyiombo Investments Limited).  
This apparent lack of competition in fertilizer supply is reportedly due to a general limited capacity of 
the private sector. However, when potential competitors to the 2-3 dominating firms are effectively 
excluded from participating in the programme, there is little chance that they may develop this capacity. 
This represents a fundamental dilemma in input subsidy programmes between the need to ensure 
smallholder access to subsidised inputs and the objectives of developing a more competitive private 
input supply sector to promote long term sustainability. 
The seed market appears somewhat more competitive, with several firms supplying different seed 
varieties (seven firms in 2008). Contracts for distributing and storing the inputs until farmers pick up 
their packages are awarded smaller private distributors and warehouse owners. The activities are, 
however, still centrally managed and there does not seem to be any trading and marketing of subsidised 
inputs by private dealers themselves. 
One of the main difficulties related to delivery of subsidised inputs to farmers is serious delays in 
arrival. According to ZFSP guidelines, inputs should be available for retrieval by farmers by end of 
October so the inputs can be applied by the beginning of the agricultural season in November. A 
survey of beneficiaries indicates that in 2008 less than 4% of subsidised inputs was distributed by end 
October and 69% of recipients reported that they did not get their inputs until after the start of the 
rains.  
The timing problems are related to government budgeting procedures and programme administration. 
The fiscal year in Zambia runs from 1 April to 31 March. As budget allocations to the ZFSP have to be 
negotiated each year, stakeholders do not know how many subsidised input packages can be distributed 
until the budget is approved by parliament in March. After final approval, the tender for supply and 
distribution of the inputs can be prepared. In 2008, the tender procedure ran throughout the summer 
and the winners were announced in August, a few months before the inputs were to be delivered. It 
should be noted that from 2010 the government was to change the fiscal year to match the calendar 
year, giving ZFSP administrators three more months to prepare activities. We have no information on 
whether this change has helped overcome the timing issues. 
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Evidence of misuse is very limited. There are some indications that input packs went missing in the 
distribution process. The World Bank (2010) notes an average 20% discrepancy between the number of 
packages the district officials say their released and cooperatives report to have received. It is not 
known what became of the missing packs, and some of it may simply be due to accounting errors. The 
large majority of farmers surveyed reported satisfaction with the quality of inputs they received. 
4.2.6. Exit strategy 
Originally, the programme was designed to run for three years, 2002/3 – 2004/5. Each of the 125,000 
beneficiary households was expected to “graduate” from the programme after two consecutive years. 
In the first year, households were to benefit from the full subsidy and in the second year, the subsidy 
would be halved. In practise, however, the exit strategy appears to have had little effect. The 
programme has been extended continuously, and the graduation mechanism is not working as planned. 
The responsibility for implementing the graduation mechanism rested with the farmer cooperatives, 
who identified beneficiaries and prepared lists of selected farmers, as well as with the District 
Agricultural Committees (DACs), who approved the lists. However, in a survey of cooperative leaders, 
only 5% of them reported that previous support from the FSP was taken into account when selecting 
recipients – the most cited criteria for support was membership of the cooperative and ability to pay 
for the subsidised inputs. Also, the DACs do not appear to have checked the lists for graduating 
farmers, let alone enforced the rule.  
4.2.7. Assessment 
The ZFSP in Zambia is plagued by many of the same difficulties as the AISP in Malawi. The greater 
use of agricultural input appears to have substantial effects on maize production, but the extra output 
comes at a very high cost. The best estimates available suggest that it would be cheaper to import maize 
for consumption in urban areas than to increase production within Zambia through the ZFSP in its 
present form. Input subsidies could still be justified if the apparent inefficiencies were outweighed by 
equity considerations or a long term sustainable development of the input sector. However, such 
effects are doubtful as discussed below.  
The most important barriers to greater efficiency of the ZFSP appear to be inappropriate targeting of 
beneficiaries and inefficient input delivery. The World Bank (2010) suggest that a large part of the 
beneficiaries already had reasonable access to agricultural inputs on commercial terms and around half 
of surveyed households purchased some inputs prior to benefiting from the ZFSP. This indicates a 
considerable risk that the subsidised input can displace input sales on commercial terms reducing the 
overall increase in input use and agricultural productivity. Further, despite efforts to involve the private 
sector in supplying and distributing the inputs through public tenders, the input delivery system appears 
highly non-competitive. Year after year fertilizer supply contracts are awarded the same 2-3 large firms, 
one of them a parastatal, indicating general lack of competition. Distribution and storage of the inputs 
is tendered out to private transporters and warehouses, but it is still centrally managed and not subject 
to much competition. In essence, the ZFSP creates a parallel state-controlled input marketing system, 
which competes with (on a subsidised basis) rather than utilizes the private market. 
It is striking that although the ZFSP objectives target smallholders in general, they do not emphasise 
particularly the poorest and most vulnerable households. It appears that the programme was designed 
to target the less-poor smallholders, possibly based on a presumption that the poorest households may 
lack the capacity to fully utilise the subsidised inputs. The evidence we have suggests that this targeting 
objective is largely met, which also means that the programme fails to benefit the poorest and most 
vulnerable households directly. 
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It is very doubtful that the increased use of agricultural inputs and higher agricultural productivity 
achieved by the ZFSP is sustainable in the long run. Unlike the AISP in Malawi, the ZFSP does contain 
an exit strategy but it is largely ignored. Programme activities are not designed to address the underlying 
causes of the low agricultural input intensity, and in some cases they may actually make things worse. 
Major barriers to input adoption appear to be the lack of access to inputs in remote areas and, where 
they are available, high prices partly due to imperfect competition. Ideally, input subsidies will stimulate 
demand and induce more firms to establish shops in remote areas, thereby increase access to inputs and 
competition in the market. However, the FSP only stimulates demand for subsidised inputs, which are 
not supplied by the market. In fact, the programme risks reducing market demand through 
displacement. The World Bank (2010) found that 7% of beneficiaries, who purchased inputs from the 
private market before receiving subsidised inputs, stopped doing this after enrolling in the programme. 
If other recipients, who continued to buy commercial inputs, reduced their private sector demand, 
displacement could be higher. Unfortunately, we do not have more precise estimates of displacement.  
Although the ZFSP encourages some private sector involvement through open tenders, the contracts 
are never awarded new or potential entrants with the justification that such new players lack the 
capacity to ensure timely delivery of inputs. However, if the programme only involves the few private 
firms that already have the capacity to deliver the inputs, it is very unlikely that it will contribute to the 
development of a more competitive private input supply sector. 
In conclusion, the ZFSP has a significant effect on food production, but costs are too high.  The main 
beneficiaries are not the poorest households – in fact the programme appears to be designed to 
specifically target the less-poor. And long term sustainability is threatened by a state-driven and non-
competitive delivery system.  
4.3. Ghana, Fertilizer Subsidy Programme (GFSP)6 
4.3.1. Background 
The fertilizer subsidies implemented in Ghana in 2008, later extended to 2009, were very different from 
the programmes implemented in Malawi and Zambia. It was never meant to be a comprehensive 
programme aimed at achieving a sustainable increase in smallholder adoption of agricultural inputs. 
Rather, it was designed in great haste as an emergency measure to mitigate the adverse impacts of the 
extremely high fertilizer prices.  
The fertilizer market in Ghana was one of the most liberalised in SSA prior to 2008 with virtually no 
government intervention. The termination of universal subsidy programmes through the 80s and 90s 
coincided with a decline in fertilizer intensity from 22 kg/ha in 1978 to 8 kg/ha in 2006 (Yawson et al 
2010). As fertilizer prices grew rapidly through 2007 and 2008, the government feared that fertilizer use 
would decline even further (by an estimated 70%), reducing agricultural productivity and food 
production (by potentially 20%), necessitating imports of food crops, the prices of which also reached 
an all-time high during this period. In March 2008, the government began discussing with leading 
importers the possibility of subsidising fertilizer to counter the rising prices, and in May it announced 
its intention to do so. However, it was not until early July that details of the programme were 
published. On 4 July 2008, the subsidy took effect, too late to benefit the major season in southern 
areas and the plantings in the northern regions, and barely in time for the second fertilizer application 
in the north and the minor season in the south. 
                                                 
6 This section is based on Banful (2009) unless otherwise noted. 
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It is part of the story that 2008 was an election year in Ghana. The incumbent New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) was seen as a party of the urban elite and stood in the polls to loose November’s election to the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC), which garnered most of its support from the rural population. 
Banful (2010b) interprets the input subsidy programme as an attempt to show farmers that the 
government had empathy for the rural population. In the event, NPP lost the election by less than 
0.01% of the votes. NDC took over the previous government’s subsidy policies and continued the 
programme for another year. 
4.3.2. Outcome 
It is not possible to estimate the outcome of the GFSP to any reasonable degree of confidence. The 
programme was designed to avoid a decline in fertilizer use and agricultural production by keeping 
fertilizer prices constant, so we cannot assess the outcome by observing increases in output. Yawson et 
al (2010) report that the fall in food output avoided could be as much as 20%, but such estimates are 
highly uncertain. Even if we take this estimate as an indication, it is not possible to calculate the value 
of the programme as we do not know exactly which crops are the main beneficiaries of the subsidised 
fertilizers. Surveys suggest that the fertilizers are applied to a wide variety of crops, including maize, 
rice, vegetables (tomatoes, cabbage, etc.), fruits (oranges), and oil palm. 
Data from Faostat show that total production of maize and rice increased substantially in 2008 and 
2009, by respectively 21% and 10% (maize), and 58% and 30% (rice). These numbers should not be 
taken as outcome estimates, as a wide variety of factors unrelated to fertilizer subsidies (e.g. weather) 
may have affected production. However, they may serve as an indication that a massive decline in 
output due to higher fertilizer prices has been avoided. To what extent this may be attributed to the 
GFSP cannot be determined. 
4.3.3. Scope 
Compared to the input subsidy programmes implemented in Malawi and Zambia, the subsidies offered 
in Ghana constitute a very small scale programme. The total costs of the programme is estimated at 
around USD 14 million in 2008 and USD 26 million was set aside to cover the costs of an extension of 
the programme in 2009 (Yawson et al 2010), corresponding to roughly 0.05% and 0.1% of GDP 
respectively. 
The size of the subsidy was set to keep the prices faced by farmers roughly the same as in 2007, around 
GHS 14 – GHS 28 (approximately the same amount in USD) per 50 kg bag of fertilizer, depending on 
the type of fertilizer and geographical location. This subsidy corresponded to around 50% of the total 
remunerations received by importers. Initially, the government planned to issue 600,000 vouchers in 
2008, each redeemable for the specified rebate on one 50 kg bag of fertilizer, but in the end more than 
1.1 million vouchers were printed, although less than 50% of those were eventually redeemed. The 
reasons for the overrun of the number of vouchers and subsequent low redemption rate are not 
entirely clear. However, it appears that lack of clear criteria for the distribution of vouchers and general 
uncertainty about how many vouchers were available in each district generated an initial shortage of 
vouchers during the critical late summer months where fertilizers are most effectively applied.7 This 
prompted the government to issue more vouchers, and the subsequent glut caused shortage of 
fertilizers. There were also reports of hoarding, in some cases even by farmers who had no intention or 
                                                 
7 Second fertilizer application in the northern regions and fertilizers for the second (minor) season in the Southern areas. 
Other peaks for fertilizer application in Ghana are during the spring and early summer, but at that point the subsidy was not 
yet in effect. 
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capacity to utilise the vouchers. We do not have detailed information on how many vouchers were 
distributed in 2009. 
4.3.4. Targeting 
The vouchers were allocated to District Agricultural Directors, who passed on the vouchers to 
extension officers for final distribution among farmers. The distribution of vouchers between districts 
was formally based on vague notions of “farmers’ need”. However, Banful (2010b) argues that the 
actual regional allocation of vouchers was more closely correlated with political factors than efficiency 
or equity considerations. Specifically, he shows that districts, which the incumbent party lost in the 
previous election in 2004, received more vouchers than districts it won. Further, the number of 
vouchers allocated to a district increases with the vote margin, with which the district was lost. Banful 
(2010b) interprets this result as attempts of “vote-buying” by the government. The weaker the 
government is in a district, the more it is favoured by the subsidy programme. 
At the sub-district level, there were no centrally stipulated criteria for who were eligible for receiving 
vouchers, so any guidance was mainly provided by the district directors. Banful (2010b) does not have 
any results on village-level allocation, but he argues that the most important politics is conducted at the 
district level anyway. As a result of the limited guidance, targeting varied greatly from district to district 
in terms of the number of vouchers each household could have (from 2 to 10 or more) and any 
characteristics of beneficiaries. Generally, it seems that most extension officers handed out vouchers to 
farmers on a first-come first-served basis. 
4.3.5. Delivery 
The GFSP stands out as one of the most liberal fertiliser support programmes in SSA by extensively 
utilising the existing private sector for input supply, distribution and retailing. The vouchers could be 
used as partial payment for fertilizers at any retailer, who would accept them. The retailers would then 
pass the vouchers up through value chain to fertilizer importers, who would ultimately redeem 
vouchers with the government. 
Such a market-oriented voucher system is potentially very efficient, as it allows farmers to choose freely 
between different suppliers spurring competition among existing businesses as well as new entrants. It 
reduces the need for the government to set up and manage parallel distribution systems and select 
suppliers and distributors through lengthy tender procedures. Also, there is less risk of hurting the 
existing private input supply sector through displacement of commercial input supplies, as these private 
suppliers are free to engage in the subsidised input trade. 
However, in practise a number of factors served to diminish these benefits. Most importantly, only 
fertilizer importers were able to redeem vouchers for cash with the government. In effect, a relatively 
small number of importers acted as gatekeepers controlling the flow of fertilizers from the world 
market to Ghana as well as the flow of subsidies from the government to farmers, which bestowed 
considerable market power on importers. A consequence of this bias was that less than 40% of all 
retailers accepted vouchers from farmers, primarily because they were unable to redeem vouchers with 
their own suppliers or because it was too expensive or too difficult to do so (Krausova and Banful, 
2010). Most retailers, particularly the smallest ones in the most remote areas, have no direct relationship 
with importers. Therefore, voucher would often have to travel through numerous steps in the supply 
chain, each step subtracting a margin from the voucher value, before reaching the government for final 
settlement (Banful, 2010a). Around half the retailers, who sold subsidised fertilizer, submitted their 
vouchers to another agricultural input dealer (Krausova and Banful, 2010). 
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There were other factors hampering programme effectiveness. Due to the late launch of the 
programme, the fertilizers arrived late in the season significantly reducing their effectiveness. Since the 
programme was announced in advance, many farmers had postponed input purchases in anticipation of 
subsidies. The distribution of vouchers was characterised by confusion and general lack of information 
regarding e.g. how many vouchers were distributed, how to get the vouchers and which retailers 
accepted them. The confusion was exacerbated by the fact that vouchers were specific to fertilizer type 
so a NPK 15:15:15 voucher could not be used to purchase urea. This led to a shortage of vouchers for 
preferred fertilizer types and many farmers had to settle for fertilizer they had little experience with. As 
a result, a large majority (92%) of households surveyed by Yawson et al (2010) were dissatisfied with 
the accessibility of subsidised fertilizer.  
4.3.6. Exit strategy 
The programme was designed and announced as an emergency response to high fertilizer prices in 
2008 and therefore intended to expire by the end of that year. In the event, the subsidies were extended 
into 2009 as well, even though the crisis had subsided by then. We have found no indications that the 
programme has been extended further. 
4.3.7. Assessment 
It was never the intention of the GFSP to achieve a long term increase in fertiliser adoption by the 
poorest smallholders, so it is perhaps unfair to judge the programme on the basis of efficiency, equity 
and sustainability related to such objectives. It is, however, interesting to evaluate some of the main 
features of the programme by these criteria to provide insights into the performance of different design 
choices. 
The background and design of the programme suggest that fertilizer importers have had a large 
influence on the government’s subsidy policies. The idea of an input subsidy was first proposed by the 
largest fertilizer importer in September 2007, and the programme was designed through a series of 
discussions between the government and the largest importers. There is little doubt that importers are 
some of the main beneficiaries of the programme. Banful (2009) reports that the total prices (subsidy + 
farmer contribution) of fertilizer during the 2008 programme period (July – December) as negotiated 
by the government and importers were in most cases significantly higher than the market prices 
prevailing immediately prior to the launch of the programme (June 2008). For instance, in the Ashanti 
region NPK 15:15:15 and urea sold for GHS 35 in June whereas the negotiated prices for July-
December were respectively GHS 50.50 and 51.50 (the extra margins on sulphate of ammonia were 
generally much lower). Not only did importers avoid a large reduction in sales, they also appear to have 
extracted a higher margin. By restricting final settlement of vouchers to relatively few large importers, 
the programme adds to the market power of importers and diminishes the efficiency gains achieved by 
implementing a highly market-oriented approach. 
A major benefit of a voucher system is that the government can potentially target the most vulnerable 
and poorest smallholders and thereby promote a more equitable distribution of productive resources. 
Such possibilities have largely been ignored in this case, although a relatively wide geographical 
distribution was achieved by making vouchers region-specific thereby forcing suppliers to serve 
remoter and more costly areas. The choice of making extension officers responsible for final 
distribution of vouchers is praised by Yawson et al (2010), as a smart and innovative approach. 
Extension officers are supposed to be in close contact with farmers and know them reasonably well 
and they can complement fertilizer vouchers with knowledge and training. Also, they may be less 
inclined to using vouchers as an instrument for political patronage than, say, village chiefs because they 
cut across tribes or ethnic groups, regions, religions and political persuasions.  
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The long-term sustainability is less of a factor in this case, due to the programme’s short term and 
narrow objectives. The subsidies are unlikely to have significantly increased fertilizer adoption relative 
to pre-GFSP periods, as the main effect was to keep prices constant. It is possible that the programme 
averted long term negative effects. If the fertilizers had not been subsidised, a large decline in demand 
could have caused struggling input suppliers to exit the market resulting in less competition and thinner 
geographical market coverage. It is, however, questionable whether the programme saved many 
suppliers as it mainly benefited importers and large (better connected) retailers, which are likely to be 
better equipped to withstand temporary shortfalls in demand. The long term outcomes of the 
programme are therefore expected to be limited. 
In conclusion, the outcome of the GFSP is uncertain, and any effect is likely to be temporary. There 
was no attempt at targeting the poorest households, and particularly large fertilizer importers appear to 
have benefited greatly from the programme. 
4.4. Tanzania, National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS)8 
4.4.1. Background 
The National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme in Tanzania (NAIVS) is a very new and still ongoing 
programme launched in 2009. Therefore, little evidence is presently available on the general 
performance of programme. We chose to include the case anyway, as a recent study (Pan and 
Christiaensen, 2011) on a pilot subsidy programme undertaken in 2008 offers detailed insights into the 
targeting performance of the voucher mechanism employed in the NAIVS. The following will 
therefore focus mostly on experiences gained from the pilot programme, but we will also comment on 
some of the features of the expanded NAIVS. 
The pilot subsidy programme initiated in 2008 and later expanded into the NAIVS in 2009 was 
launched by the Government of Tanzania in response to the high food and fertilizer prices prevailing in 
2007-2008. Agricultural input intensity is very low in Tanzania, farmers use on average 8 kg/ha of 
fertilizers (below SSA average), and only 5.7% of rice farmers and 0.7% of maize farmers use improved 
seed varieties together with fertilizers.  Agricultural productivity is low by international standards and 
relative Tanzania’s own potential as measure by research field tests and on-farm trials (World Bank, 
2009). The government therefore argued that the best way to improve national food security in the face 
of high international food prices was to promote the use of agricultural inputs to raise productivity. 
4.4.2. Outcome 
It is still too early to assess the outcome of the NAIVS. We have not found any attempts in the 
literature to make even preliminary estimations. 
4.4.3. Scope 
The NAIVS is designed to reach a total of 2.5 million households (around 45% of all smallholders in 
Tanzania) in 65 districts, and subsidies are specifically targeted at producers of two major food staple 
crops, maize and rice. Each beneficiary household is entitled to an input package suited for the 
cultivation of ½ ha of maize or rice at a 50% subsidy.9 Thus, the input package is larger than the ones 
offered to Malawi farmers, but smaller than the Zambian equivalents. The subsidy is smaller than in 
                                                 
8 This section is based on Pan and Christiaensen (2011) and World Bank (2009) unless otherwise stated. 
9 Specifically, 1) one bag of urea; 2) one bag of Di-ammonium Phosphates or two bags of Minjungu Rock Phosphate with 
nitrogen supplement; and 3) 10 kg of hybrid or OPV maize seeds or 16 kg of rice seeds. 
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both of these countries, and it appears to be fixed in percentage terms, implying that farmer 
contributions will vary in proportion to input prices. The programme is budgeted at USD 299 million 
over three years, of which USD 139 million is covered by the Government of Tanzania and the rest 
financed by the World Bank. This corresponds to around 0.4% of GDP in 2009. 
4.4.4. Targeting 
The programme establishes a chain of Voucher Committees at the Regional, District and Village levels 
to oversee allocation and distribution of vouchers. The vouchers are allocated specifically to high-
potential maize and rice production regions and to areas where rice farmers have access to irrigation. 
The Village Voucher Committees (VVC) are six-member bodies (three women and three men) elected 
by village assemblies. The VVCs are responsible for selecting beneficiaries and prepare lists of 
recipients for approval by the village assemblies. 
The pilot programme in 2008 stipulated very few, broad targeting criteria. VVCs were advised to target 
literate farming households willing to use the input vouchers for the purported crops and able to meet 
the farmers’ co-financing. Such criteria mainly pointed towards the less poor households and left 
significant targeting powers at the discretion of the VVCs.  
The study by Pan and Christiaensen (2011) sets out to estimate the targeting performance of the 2008 
pilot programme relative to the programme’s two overall objectives, 1) to increase overall maize and 
rice output, and 2) to increase access to modern inputs among poor and vulnerable smallholders. The 
first criterion is effectively an efficiency criterion as they estimate to which extent the pilot programme 
targets households, who are able to increase output the most. The second criterion relates to equality. 
The study is based on a household panel survey, which allows the authors to better control for factors 
unrelated to the pilot programme. 
The study provides three striking results: Firstly, the estimated targeting performance is very close to 
what would prevail if vouchers were allocated randomly between intended (poor or productive) and 
unintended (less-poor or less-productive) targets. Targeting towards the most productive households is 
slightly better than random, but targeting in favour of the poor is slightly worse. Secondly, the authors 
find clear evidence of what they refer to as elite capture. Specifically, they estimate that elected village 
officials receive about 60% of the distributed vouchers, and other indicators of political connectedness, 
such as access to TV, radio and internet or participation in public meetings or farmer’s associations, 
also significantly increases the likelihood of receiving vouchers. As the “political elite” tends to be less 
poor, this bias goes a long way to explain the poor targeting performance. Thirdly, the targeting 
performance relative to the poverty objective tends to improve with the number of vouchers available 
for distribution. This suggests that the bias in targeting resulting from elite capture can be reduced by 
ensuring a reasonable household coverage. 
These results can be interpreted in the following way. That targeting on average is not too far from a 
random allocation, and 60% of all vouchers go to the elite, could indicate that the remaining vouchers 
were very well targeted. Perhaps the political connections of the elite provide a privileged access to 
vouchers. Once the demand of the elite is “saturated”, the remaining vouchers go to the intended 
targets. Such an interpretation is also consistent with the finding that targeting performance increases 
with household coverage. Passing a certain threshold, the elite has already taken its share and the full 
increment in vouchers is allocated to intended targets.  
Following the experiences gained by the pilot programme, the expanded NAIVS programme document 
defined the targeting criteria as: 
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1. Full time farmers residing in the village 
2. Farmers cultivate less than one hectare of maize or rice 
3. Farmers use the subsidised input of maize or rice production 
4. Farmers agree to serve as good examples in how to use good agricultural practices 
5. Farmers are willing and able to cover the co-financing 
6. Female-headed households are given priority 
7. Farmers, who have not used inputs in the past five years, are given priority 
These criteria attempt to clarify the intended targeting, but inconsistencies still exist. For instance, some 
criteria focus on the most vulnerable smallholders (less than one ha of land and female-headed), 
whereas others effectively excludes the poorest households (ability to cover co-financing). Also, several 
criteria may be very difficult to document (no recent input use) or enforce (serve as a good example). 
Whether the redefinition and clarification of criteria improves targeting performance remains to be 
seen. 
4.4.5. Delivery 
Input supply, distribution and retail are largely undertaken by private sector actors. Farmers turn in 
vouchers for a rebate at specifically certified agro-dealers, who can redeem the vouchers directly with a 
branch of the National Microfinance Bank (NMB). Certification is open to any agro-dealer, who 
completes a business and management training programme organised by the Citizens Network for 
Foreign Affairs (CNFA), an NGO. The agro-dealers procure the inputs from the open market, which is 
reportedly rather competitive.  
Due to the recent launch of the programme, we have found no evidence on the performance of the 
delivery system. Pan and Christiaensen (2011), who focus exclusively on targeting, do not discuss 
delivery.  
4.4.6. Exit strategy 
The programme plans for a duration of three years, and farmers are eligible for a maximum of three 
years of support. The beneficiaries of the pilot programme continue to receive vouchers under the 
expanded NAIVS, and new entrants are expected in each year of the programme duration. Therefore, 
additional government support is needed for two years after programme termination to complete the 
three-year cycle of late entrants. 
4.4.7. Assessment 
The experiences gained from the pilot input subsidy programme in Tanzania highlights the potential 
trade-off between objectives of raising national food production on the one hand and benefiting the 
poorest and most vulnerable households on the other – or in the economic terminology - between 
efficiency and equity. The farmers, who are most capable of translating an increase in agricultural input 
use into expanded output, are not necessarily the poorest farmers. Indeed, Pan and Christiaensen 
(2010) suggest that targeting the poorest households has a lower impact on crop production than 
benefiting the less poor. 
These findings suggest that it may be necessary to decide whether the primary objective of the input 
subsidy programme is pro-poor growth or improved national agricultural production. The dual 
objectives of the TFSP risks worsening the targeting performance and reducing the chance to meet any 
of the objectives. 
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Under the NAIVS, locally elected VVCs are responsible for selecting beneficiaries, and the list of 
recipients must be approved by the village assemblies. This design choice is made to enhance 
transparency and accountability. However, it also places significant power with the local political elite, 
which may divert programme benefits away from intended targets and thereby reduce programme 
performance in terms of both efficiency and equity. Pan and Christiaensen (2010) found that targeting 
performance may be improved by ensuring a relatively high household coverage. However, such a 
strategy implies a tacit acceptance of the fact that some programme benefits will be captured by 
unintended targets. 
Due to the recent launch of the programme, we have little evidence, on which we can evaluate 
programme sustainability. However, a few observations on programme design can be made. Of the 
four input subsidy programmes investigated in this evaluation study, the delivery system of NAIVS is 
perhaps the one that is most in line with the market-based approach characterising an ideal smart 
subsidy programme. It is designed to interfere very little in the existing private market, and in contrast 
with the GFSP in Ghana, it places the voucher settlement with an actor outside the input supply value 
chain (the NMB) thereby dispersing some of the market power. This may be sufficient to avoid 
significant distortion of the private market. On the other hand, it also presumes that a reasonably 
competitive private market already exists, and it is not clear how inputs may be delivered to more 
remote areas, where the private sector may be less developed. Apart from the market oriented 
approach, there is little to suggest that the programme to any large extent addresses the potential 
underlying barriers to widespread input adoption, such as credit constraints, risk of crop failure, etc. It 
is therefore questionable whether any rise in the use of agricultural inputs will persist after termination 
of the programme. 
In conclusion, the NAIVS in Tanzania represents an example of a highly market oriented input subsidy 
programme. Significant resources are diverted to benefiting the less-poor with good political 
connections. We have no information on the short term outcomes of the programme, and there is little 
to suggest that outcomes will be sustainable in the long term. 
5. Lessons Learned 
The assessment of the four cases above illustrates the complexity of subsidising agricultural inputs and 
highlights some of the challenges that must be addressed to ensure that a subsidy programme enhances 
efficiency, equity and long term sustainability of agricultural input use. This section will summarise 
some of the main lessons learned from the four cases and where the most important gaps are in the 
current state of knowledge.  
5.1. Background 
What have we learned? 
• Most of the programmes reviewed here were implemented in response to adverse shocks to 
agricultural markets. The AISP in Malawi was launched after a severe drought and poor 
harvests in 2004/5, and the programmes in Ghana and Tanzania were implemented in response 
to high fertilizer prices in 2008. This suggests that the political motivation behind the 
programmes was a desire to signal leadership and decisiveness in response to an emergency. 
Efficiency, equity and sustainability may have been secondary objectives at best. 
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5.2. Outcome 
What have we learned? 
• Significant increases in agricultural productivity and food production is possible, and the 
potential for improving agricultural productivity by subsidising agricultural inputs exists. 
However the estimates are somewhat uncertain. Costs are very high, and given uncertainties it is 
unclear whether the programmes provide value for money. 
• There is very little convincing evidence to suggest that outcomes are likely to persist after 
termination of the programmes. However, the subsidy programmes are designed to address the 
distortions created by market imperfections rather than the market imperfections themselves. 
When (if) the programmes are phased out, input use is likely to decline again. 
What do we need to know? 
• It is very difficult to judge if input subsidy programmes are a good investment given the 
information available at this point. In particular, more precise estimates are needed of impacts, 
as well as opportunity costs in terms of returns on alternative investments foregone. Also, 
estimates of dynamic (long term) impacts are virtually non-existent, so there is little evidence 
upon which to evaluate the long term sustainability of the programmes. 
• More knowledge is needed on how to promote sustainability of a subsidy programme. A more 
sustainable programme would focus more on alleviating the market failures, which distorts 
agricultural markets, and less on mitigating the effects of the distortions.  
5.3. Scope 
What have we learned? 
• Subsidy design involves trade-offs between efficiency, equity and sustainability. If the subsidy 
varies with input prices (as in the programmes in Malawi and Zambia), poor farmers are partly 
or completely shielded from high prices, but economic returns from the programme becomes 
more variable and likely negative when input prices are high. Also, high input prices risk 
financial sustainability of the programme. On the other hand, if the subsidy is fixed in 
percentage terms (as in Ghana and Tanzania), farmers share a part of the burden of higher 
input prices, which could exclude the poorest farmers and cause disruptions in the functioning 
of input markets. 
• The nature and scope of the subsidy is closely related to targeting performance. Greater 
household coverage improves targeting performance, as demonstrated in Tanzania. The size of 
the subsidy determines how easy it is for the poor to meet co-financing requirements. Larger 
input packages make the subsidy less relevant for poor farmers (as exemplified in Zambia). 
Finally, a relatively large scale programme is needed to achieve a reasonable effect on national 
food security and food prices. 
What do we need to know? 
• More knowledge is needed on the consequences of input price volatility for programme 
performance and, particularly, long term sustainability. Does an input price spike, like the one 
observed in 2007-2008 simply lead to a temporary decline in demand and agricultural 
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productivity, or does it have more serious long term repercussions for smallholder adoption of 
agricultural inputs, private input markets, credit constraints, etc.?   
5.4. Targeting 
What have we learned? 
• None of the four programmes examined here succeed at targeting the poorest and most 
vulnerable households. Indeed, some of the programmes did not intend to. A voucher scheme 
has a potential for targeting subsidies at specific groups of farmers, poor and vulnerable 
households, farmers who do not already use inputs, most productive farmers, etc. However, 
realising the potential is very difficult. 
• The institutions with the responsibility for selecting beneficiaries have considerable discretion 
over subsidy allocation, which generates the potential for favouritism, corruption and political 
patronage. There is considerable scope for clarifying and focusing the targeting criteria in all 
four programmes, but the question remains whether and how such targeting criteria can be 
enforced. 
What do we need to know? 
• How are targeting mechanisms best designed to avoid or minimise targeting bias? Is a certain 
degree of favouritism a necessary cost for a reasonably well targeted subsidy? Is such a cost 
acceptable? 
5.5. Delivery 
What have we learned? 
• Smart subsidy programmes seek to promote the development of a competitive private input 
distribution network to enhance efficiency and long term sustainability. Yet some programmes 
employ large existing firms, to the effective exclusion of new smaller entrants, precisely 
because the large firms already have reasonably well developed distribution networks. The 
desire to ensure effective delivery of inputs to farmers risks undermining the development of a 
competitive private delivery system. 
• There is a trade-off between efficiency and (regional) equity in input delivery. Efficiency can be 
enhanced by utilizing existing private input supply sector (provided the private sector is 
reasonably competitive), but this may come at the cost of regional coverage, by effectively 
excluding remote areas where markets are thin and private agro-dealers largely absent. Is it 
possible to complement the private sector in dense areas with state-managed supply in remote 
areas? Or can a subsidy programme induce the private sector to expand into remote areas? 
• Most of the programmes experienced serious delays and uncertainty in the delivery of inputs to 
farmers, mainly due to administrative challenges. Such delays may have severe consequences 
for programme efficiency and sustainability. Postponing application of inputs diminishes yields 
directly, and uncertainties about input subsidy entitlements may cause farmers to reduce 
commercial purchases. 
What do we need to know? 
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• Apart from the timing issues, we have encountered little evidence on the actual performance of 
the input delivery system (with the possible exception of Ghana). For instance how 
competitive is the private input supply sector (what are the costs of market power?), how well 
developed are the input markets in remote areas and how efficient are alternative state-
controlled distribution channels? 
5.6. Exit Strategy 
What have we learned? 
• Exit strategies are largely absent, non-credible or never enforced in the Malawi and Zambia 
programmes. In Ghana the exit strategy was implicit in the single-year scope (expanded to two) 
of the programme. In Tanzania, the exit strategy has not yet been tested. Exit strategies are 
based on the premise that positive effects of the programme persists after programme 
termination. There is very little convincing evidence to suggest that this is likely to happen. 
• Absence of a clear programme duration can lead to poor programme performance by 
increasing uncertainty about future entitlements and preventing the continuous flow of funding 
and inputs. If programme continuation and scope has to be decided each fiscal year, the 
structure of the public budget-cycle may cause delays in the final delivery of inputs (as 
demonstrated by the ZFSP in Zambia). 
What do we need to know? 
• More knowledge is needed on how to make an exit strategy effective and credible. Subsidy 
programmes are often popular and there is considerable political pressure for their 
continuation and expansion. How can such pressures be countered to improve chances of long 
term sustainability? 
6. Conclusion 
Based on the findings presented in this evaluation study, we conclude that agricultural input subsidies 
are not likely to be an appropriate use of scarce fiscal resources, if subsidy programmes are designed 
and implemented in ways similar to the four programmes studied here. It is true that input subsidies 
appear to raise agricultural productivity substantially. The programmes in Malawi and Zambia have 
shown impressive effects on national food production. However, the so-called smart subsidy 
programmes considered in this study are still plagued by many of the same problems associated with 
the earlier generation of universal input subsidy programmes. Programme performance could 
potentially be improved by addressing the issues outlined below, but the challenges are huge. 
First, the programmes are too costly and inefficient. They fail to properly utilise the efficiencies offered 
by the private input markets by channelling resources through parastatal entities (Malawi), state-
managed distribution networks (Zambia), or large non-competitive corporations (Malawi, Zambia and 
Ghana).10 Other factors have reduced the effectiveness of input subsidies: Poor targeting have resulted 
in displacement of non-subsidised private sector sales, limiting the total expansion in the use of 
agricultural inputs. And administrative problems have led to significant delays, generating uncertainty 
                                                 
10 Input delivery in Tanzania may be more competitive, but we do not yet have sufficient information on the delivery 
performance of the NAIVS. 
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about entitlements and postponing the application of inputs. Additionally, the sheer size of the 
programmes, particularly in Malawi and Zambia, significantly limits the resources available for other 
investments and threatens the sustainability of government finances. 
Second, most programme benefits accrue to less-poor and politically well-connected households as well 
as large input suppliers. In some cases (Malawi and Tanzania), priority is officially given to the poorest 
and most vulnerable households. In practise, they are largely excluded due to relatively high co-
financing requirements (Ghana and Tanzania), input package size (Zambia), and conflicting or vague 
targeting criteria (Malawi and Tanzania). The institutions responsible for beneficiary selection (local 
councils, cooperatives and extension officers) enjoy considerable discretion over who will receive the 
subsidised inputs, and this authority provides opportunities for rent seeking and political manipulation. 
Large input suppliers are some of the main beneficiaries of the programmes as they face guaranteed 
demand at often inflated prices, and as they in some cases are bestowed special privileges (Malawi, 
Zambia and Ghana). 
Third, the subsidy programmes mainly attack the symptoms of low input use and poor agricultural 
productivity rather than the underlying “disease” of high input procurement costs and market failures. 
Long term sustainability of the programmes is therefore doubtful. It is possible that a truly market 
oriented programme may strengthen the competitiveness of the agricultural input markets, but if input 
demand collapses after termination of the programme such gains may disappear. The greater use of 
agricultural inputs may persist if smallholders manage to accumulate enough assets to overcome credit 
constraints and become less vulnerable to crop failure. There are, however, no signs of this happening.  
Fourth, there is a substantial risk that an exit strategy will be ineffective (as demonstrated by Malawi 
and Zambia). Once an input subsidy programme is launched, most stakeholders have a great interest in 
its continuation and expansion. Recipients benefit directly, the local elite may use subsidies as a tool to 
reach political objectives, input suppliers enjoy a stable demand and possibly greater market power, and 
national policy makers may point towards tangible results of their policies in terms of higher 
agricultural output. Likely consequences are that the programme becomes more entrenched in the 
political system and more subject to political manipulation and rent seeking. 
It may be possible to improve efficiency, equity and sustainability of the input subsidy programmes, but 
the challenges are huge. A voucher scheme is potentially an effective instrument for disconnecting 
input delivery from subsidy targeting, thereby allowing the private sector to handle input delivery while 
the state organises targeting. The programmes in Tanzania and Ghana demonstrate that such a division 
of labour between the state and the private sector is possible. But they also show that institutional 
details, such as who has the power to redeem vouchers with the government, greatly affect programme 
performance. A more efficient or pro-poor targeting may be difficult to achieve. No matter how clearly 
target criteria are specified, they need to be enforced to be effective. Most likely, those who identify 
beneficiaries will always have some discretionary power which can be exploited. As input subsidies are 
unlikely to alleviate market failures directly, long term sustainability of programme impacts largely 
depends on recipients’ ability to accumulate financial assets from production surpluses generated by the 
subsidies. We have seen no evidence of this happening.  
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